Introduction.
It is commonplace to base computer security and information security on hard problems. Recent cryptosystems have been based on the knapsack problem [DE83, BRS5] and the problem of factoring an integer [DE83, pp. 104-1091. The former problem is N P complete [GA79, p. 2471. The place of the latter problem in complexity theory is not well understood, but it has been around in number theory for a long time.
We will base a family of discrete cryptosystems and continuous scramblers on ideas related to ill-posed problems in differential equations. Once again, complexity theory has little to say about the difficulty of such problems. But they have been around in analysis for a long time.
Our approach will be to proceed from a toy system through a series of more realistic systems, taking up various considerations of decodability, bandwidth expansion, intersymbol dependence, computational expense, and security as they arise. One feature of this approach which will be evident from the outset is its neutrality between the discrete and the continuous realms in communication security. In this respect it is much in the spirit of [BL85, BLS6, BLST] , which treat various information-theoretic objects in a way designed to minimize dependency on any finiteness properties they may have. More specifically, it is an approach to cryptosystem design closely akin to that recently taken by Davida, Gilbertson and Walker [DA86] .
The paper begins by examining partial differential equations (PDEs) suggested by the time evolution of the distribution of temperature in a rod. The plaintext is the initial conditions (i.e. the temperature profile u at t = 0), and the cryptext is the t = 1 temperature profile. The key is, in a sense to be made clearer below, largely the PDE itself. The role of the boundary conditions is important too. In the end we will not confine ourselves to Dirichlet (fixing a solution u at the end points of the rod) or Neumann (Lying u z at the end points of the rod) problems. But for a while we will restrict our consideration to the Diricblet conditions: u(0, t ) = u(1, t ) = 0 for all t 2 0 .
It is important to note at the outset that security dictates the introduction of nonlinearities at many points. In our particular case this entails the use of nonlinear partial differential operators. Clarity of exposition. on the other hand, calls for casting the discussion herein in linear terms whenever possible. This engages the reader's intuition more readily, and enables us to bring a larger variety of theoretical results to bear on the subject matter. The inevitable compromise this entails should not mislead anyone. Any good implementation of these ideas will be nonlinear through and through, despite any linear biases in the exposition below. 
Plaintext and encoded text as
An encode/decode pair (c, d ) is a pair of functions 
Somebody who would rather encode a discrete message than a continuous one can use the same technique after source coding in some appropriate manner. One simple system is to use ASCII code, or some similar code, or to assign integer values to symbols. It is necessary to decide on a block length N , and to partition [0, 1] into N subintervals. After that, the plaintext is a function whose value on the jth subinterval is the integer corresponding to the jth symbol in the block. For example, one way to source code is by the correspondence 
Here the eight subintervals have been chosen to be of equal length, 1/8. This is not necessary. Also, f(x) has been modified to satisfy the homogeneous boundary conditions f(0) = f ( 1 ) = 0 . The encoding of the previous section has the feature that small changes in the plaintext message f cause changes in the encoded message g which are spread throughout g . There is, in the terminology of classical cryptography, "strong intersymbol dependence". A mathematical term for this is "smeaxing", and it is referred to physically as "diffusion". We will use whatever one of these expressions seems appropriate to the context below. There are provable lower bounds on the extent of this intersymbol dependence, a point to which we shall return in Section 10 below. Parabolic PDEs such as (2.2) or (2.4) obey the strong maximum principle [RUiG] . Thus they enable a cryptosystem designer to produce provable, and sometimes very precise, estimates of diffusion (intersymbol dependence). The physical idea behind this is straightforward, though uorealistic, since energy would have to be transmitted faster than light. In elementary tests [B077, pp. 511-5151 students read about the ordinary heat equation
They discover that it has the feature that, when a torch is applied to a point 20 on a cold rod a t time t = 0 , every point of the rod is warm [B077, p. 4891 (some warmer than others) a t every subsequent time ( t > 0). The same infinitely fast heat propagation property characterizes generalizations such a s Mathematically, this says that if f ( 2 ) 2 0 for 5 E [0, 1] , and is nontrivial then g(z) > 0 for 2 E ( 0 , l ) . Suppose that f is zero, except in some small neighborhood Strong intersymbol dependence is not, by itself, s 6 c i e n t to make an encoding process cryptographically strong. Error control codes also have this feature, but possess little cryptographic strength. And, in fact. the encoding above is not a cryptosystem. It is a fixed process relying on a kno-m equation, the heat equation.
There is no secret key material which a sender and a receiver can share before they begin using this encoding as the basis of a secure communicatioIis system.
But is the encoding process of this section a one-way function? It would appear to be. There is no known feasible way to turn the process around, so as to proceed from knowledge of an encoded message g to produce the plaintext message f which gave rise to g . The heat equation does not "reverse in time". We will expand on this point toward the end of the next section.
741 high security login scheme.
At this point we have the rudiments of a possible alternative to Purdy's [PU 4. Introducing key dependence into the encoding process. 111-posed problems.
We will now assume that the sender and receiver get together in secret to modify the heat equation as the basis of an encoding process. Suppose they replace it by the equation (1) There exists a solution to the problem; (2) The solution is unique; (3) The solution depends continuously on the boundary data.
A problem is iIZ-posed, in Hadamard's terminology, if it is not well-posed.
Let US look at the Fourier expansion The functions gn(z) are in this case gn(x) = (1/n3) sin(n7z).
They tend uniformly t o zero in any norm one might conceivably impose on the problem. On the other hand the sequence {fn} cannot converge) in any reasonable norm. In consequence no error, no matter how small, in the codetext can be guaranteed to produce a bounded error in the decoded approximation to the plaintext, even if it were possible to produce such a decoded approximation. Coupled with the boundary condition (2.3) and the initial condition (Z.l), it has a solution
Hence f can be recovered from g by means of the relation
The positivity of these two exponential transformations can be shown using the maximum principle for pseudoparabolic partial differential equations [RU76].
6. Computational procedures and costs in the linear case.
Linear and a f h e maps are abhorrent to cryptosystem designers. Nevertheless it is instructive to examine encryption and decryption calculations in the linear case to show how pseudoparabolic PDEs differ from parabolic, and to get a jumping-off place from which to examine the nonlinear case later. Let L be a linear ordinary differential operator involving only differentiation with respect to the position variable 
The most simple-minded way to structure the computation of g , given f , and the computation of f , given g , is the following. In this case (6.5) takes the form where Go is the Green's function for M , and is given by
In each successive application of 6 that is required to approximate g(z) by (6.7), we see that the coefficient u ( z ) (our chosen key) comes in to m o m the input function by integration against u ( x ) .
The above analysis was presented only to show the workings of the encryption operator and its dependence on the coefficient a(.). In practice one would not use a power series method, but rather a finite difference scheme based, for example, on the Crank-Nicholson method [Y073, pp. 1078, 1086-loss] .
It must be emphasized that the decryption process is entirely the same as encrypt ion codetest = exp(-A) (plaintext) plaintext = exp(A) (codetext) since both initial and final value problems are solved in the same manner for the equation (5.1).
Cryptosystems based on nonlinearities in pseudoparabolic PDEs.
If p = 1 in L as in (4.4), and the transformation u + ue-t is performed on (5.1) then, as in section 6, we arrive at the simplest form of our equation
Even in this basic case it is not easy to find q(x) from a knowledge of both f (~) and g(z). Problems of this kind are called undetermined coefficient problem and in most cases are notoriously ill-posed. There may be an infinite number of Q(Z) that would yield the same g(z) from a given f(x). Even if this were not so, there may be two functions Q~(z) and qZ(z) that take a given plaintext onto very similar codetexts, yet for another plaintext, the corresponding codetexts would not be close. If q = q ( z , t ) were allowed to be time-dependent then it would, at least in theory, be impossible to obtain this function of two variables by giving only one additional function g at the single variable 2.
Equations of the form (6.6) are simply matrix equations of size N by N . Such equations could be solved for the eigenvectors of the matrix given a sufEcient quantity of plaintext-codetext pairs. Even if it were not possible to recover the key, it might be possible to read the messages.
This leads to the final modification in our cryptosystem, the addition of some nonlinear terms. Equations of the type (4.3) or (5.1) are referred to as "diffusion equations". This terminology is based on one of their features. They spread initially localized heat throughout the body -the very property that gives us our intersymbol dependence. The addition of a reaction term F , if correctly chosen, can tend to counteract this diffusing tendency by further increasing the temperature at places where u(x, t ) is already large. These combination equations are referred to as "reaction-diffusion" equations. Our chosen type of equation reads
where the function F may depend on x , t , u and u, . In (7.2) one could also assume that the coefficients of L depend on x , t , u, u, and the maximum principle would still hold (under suitable restrictions on sign) as would the invertibility of (7.2) in time. The boundary conditions u(0, t ) = u(1, t ) = 0 could be generalized to conditions of the form uz + h(t)u = p(t> where h and 3 could form part of the key.
They could also be made nonlinear. t , u, u r ) and the solution to this can be written in the form Even for the simple model problem (6.11) it is not known whether one can recover the key material u(x) from a knowledge of f(z) and g(z). If, of course, enough message pairs are intercepted then eventually, since the problem is Linear, it is possible for a cryptanalyst to find the action of the system on each element of a basis for the set of possible plaintexts. This could then be used to read subsequent messages. In the case of a nonlinear version of the system this method is no longer applicable. The possibility of recovering a function F of the form F ( z , t , u, u,) from measurements of f, g pairs lies outside the scope of present research in the area of undetermined coefficient problems in partial differential equations at present. And the image of a vector space of plaintext messages will be, at best, a complicated manifold of cryptext messages. So even reading subsequent messages in the absence of key information appears to be a difficult problem.
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10. Block size, its effect on security, the cost of encryption and error
control
In the discrete case, and for linear models, we can give an indication of what should be the expected dependence of the performance of the system on blocksize.
Suppose two messages fl and f:! differ only at one position. The if we let g1 and 92 be the associated codetexts, we see that where fi -fi is zero except for the interval, say I , where the difference occurs. See Figure 10 .1.
From the physical interpretation of the system as a model of heat flow, one would expect that g1 -92 # 0 for all 2 , 0 < z < 1, and this is in fact guaranteed by the maximum principle for pseudoparabolic equations [RU76]. Thus somebody who kept the codetest g to arbitrary precision would be assured that every change in the plaintext would give rise to a change in every element of the codetext. In practice it is necessary to truncate g(z). To how many places should g(z) be kept? The answer depends on what you expect from the system, It is necessary to retain g(x) to sufficient accuracy so you can invert to recover f(x). For example if f (~)
is formed by the scheme (2.4) then an error in f(x) of at most 0.5 is tolerable, and a further margin of safety would be desirable. Standard estimates for differential operators make it possible to calculate the maximum error in g(z) for a given error in f ( z ) , and conversely. The actual factor will, of course, depend fairly strongly on the choice of the coefficients. For example if a 5 0 in (6.11), the error in f(z)
obtained by inverting the equation in time will be less than that in g(z). This is a consequence of the mzxirnum principle. For this example, one could thus recover f(x) despite an error in g(z) of as much as f0.5. An important consideration is to retain sufficient accuracy in g(z) so that all (or at least a high fraction) of the values of g at the grid points are still seen to be positive after truncation, when g is the codetext coming from the function f1 -f;: .
Can this be estimated? This is in theory possible even in the full nonlinear case, but a practical bound may be exceedingly difficult to obtain. In the case of our simple model (6.11) we can make a reasonable quantifiable attempt. However, it should be stressed that in d cases the value of a g ( 2 ) that is produced from such an f~ -f2 will decrease (linearly) with blocksize. Suppose the change in f represegts one of unit height in a blocksize N. Then, if transformed to blocksize nN for n > 1 , this would represent n changes, each of unit height.
If u ( x ) 5 0 then from (6.7), (6.13) we see that
Note that if h 2 0 then Gh 2 0 (a simple consequence of the maximum principle for ordinary differential equations). Thus G is a positive operator and it follows that this would predict that with N = 100 one would require 7 figure accuracy in g(z) . The choice of blocksize will have an effect on computational speed. In section 6 we showed that in the simplest case the calculation of g = exp(-A)f was equivalent to multiplying the N vector f by an N x N matrix, the matrix exp(-A), where N is the blocksize. In the nonlinear case the computational time using the common finite difference schemes is also proportional to N 2 . Of course for a given size text, increasing the blocksize by a factor of N puts the text through the encryption process N times as fast, so that there is a linear increase in total computation time with increase in blocksize. Not only does g(z) have the same L-limited bandwidth as f(x) but, for large n , the energy in each band is of the same order of magnitude (11.6) A transmitter can be thought of as the vibration of a homogeneous material, the governing equation of motion being the wave equation, which in one space dimension is
If we could build an inhomogeneous transmitter whose motion was governed by the hyperbolic equation 
.
If a transmitter/receiver pair were to be built using (11.7) as the governing equation then this process would share many of the ideas of our cryptosystem for the linear case. Even if an eavesdropper could determine a.ll the frequencies of vibration of this linear system, (tantamount to knowing all the eigenvalues of L), then this is insufEcient to recover the operator L [H073] . This is a statement of the classical inverse Sturm-Liouville problem. If additional information is given, for example the energy in each eigenmode, then recovery methods are possible in one space dimension. In higher space dimensions the determination of L from such spectral data remains an enigma. With current technology it might be possible to reconfigure a trmmitter/receiver pair electronically without actually modifying the hardware.
Finally, it should be noted that the bandwidth expansion problem in the nonlinear case is difficult to treat theoretically due to the loss of the superposition principle. The maximum principle guarantees that there will be bandwidth expansion, and numerical simulations could be performed in order to obtain quantitative estimates.
Numerical examples.
We ran a numerical simulation of the encryption system in a simple case; taking the linear model and restricting our attention to the equation (5.1) with L the operator 6 = ~ ( z ) . We converted alphanumeric plaintext into a piecewise constant function f(x) by means of (2.4), and adjusted the norm of the key ~( z ) so that the codetext g(z), when evaluated at the gridpoints xi = i / N , lay in the range 0-999 after rounding off to the nearest integer. This retention in accuracy in g(z) was sufficient to recover the plaintext f(z) in all cases that we ran. The maximum blocksize attempted was N = 512. With N in the range 50-100 we found that a single change in a character in the plaintext changed on average all of the values of the codetext, although some by only one or two numbers. The greatest change was usually near the gridpoint where the change in the plaintext occured, but this was somewhat key-dependent .
When we attempted to decode a message with a key that differed at only one gridpoint from the one used to encrypt, we found that the resulting "plainte~t'~ had changed by one or two numbers in about 1/3 to 1/2 of the positions, again concentrated near the position of key change. Blocksize was again in the range 50-100.
There is no reason why such an approach need be restricted to a single space variable z. In fact fax, photos and other multidimensional messages might more naturally be considered by means of pseudoparabolic PDEs in 0 x [0,1] where fl is some appropriate region in R" .
13.
The need for error control in t h e discrete case.
It is clear that finite computational resources produce a decryption which is merely close to, not exactly equal to, the plaintext which was originally encrypted. The difference can be enough to change a symbol here and there. This will put a slightly perturbed version of the original plaintext into the receiver's hands. If large block size (of the order of hundreds of bits) is used there is not much overhead expense in applying an agreed-upon error-control coding process to the plaintext before encrypting. If the language in which the plaintext message is written has a fair amount of redundancy this may not be necessary. If that language has almost no redundancy, then very cheap simple cryptosystems are probably adequate to conceal message traffic in it.
Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate the feasibility of basing a family of conventional (as opposed to public key) cryptosystems on a circle of hard problems arising in the theory of partial differential equations. We have shown why it is hard to avoid the use of nonlinear pseudoparabolic PDEs and, possibly, of nonlinear boundary conditions in formulating such a cryptosystem. Our methodology is neutral as regards continuous or discrete messages. It seems quite amenable to analog calculations now that there are natural purely analog methods [PE 861 'for time reversal of a4 optical signal.
As often happens in cryptographic discussions, we have actually said only that somebody who knows how to solve interesting and long-standing hard problems (in analysis, in the case of this family of cryptosystems) can break cryptosystems expeditiously. But like other cryptosystem designers we allow ourselves to think that, so far, it looks as if the converse is also true.
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